INTRODUCTION
For a very long time in the history of copyright, the coming into existence and/or the exercise of copyright was subjected to formalities of some kind. The first modern laws on copyright, including the 1710 UK Statute of Anne, the 1790 US Federal Copyright Act and the 1791 and 1793 French droit d'auteur decrees, all imposed formalities. To enjoy copyright protection or to enforce the right before courts, these laws required authors or copyright owners to register their copyrights, to deposit copies of their works or to mark these copies with some kind of copyright notice. 1 These statutory formalities were maintained in later copyright acts, not only of the states just mentioned, but of nearly all countries worldwide. 2 Around the end of the nineteenth century, however, a number of states, particularly those in continental Europe, began to limit imposing formalities on authors or to soften their nature * Ph.D. candidate, Institute for Information Law, University of Amsterdam; LL.M. University of Amsterdam (2005) . You are invited to direct any comments, criticism or ideas on this paper to: vangompel@ivir.nl. 1 See secs II (registration) and V (deposit) of the Act for the Encouragement of Learning (1710), 8 Anne, c. 19 (UK); secs 1 (renewal registration), 3 (registration and publication of a copy of the record of entrance in US newspapers) and 4 (deposit) of the US Federal Copyright Act of 31 May 1790 (1st Cong., 2nd Sess., c. 15); and art. 6 of the French Decree of 19-24 July 1793 on the property rights of authors of writings of all kind, of music composers, of painters and of designers (deposit). The French Decree of 13-19 January 1791 on theatrical plays required authors who wished to retain a public performance right in their plays, to publicly announce this by a notice, which should be deposited with a notary and printed at the text of the play. The 1791 Decree, however, was repealed by the Decree of 1 September 1793 and the prescribed formality did not reappear in later acts. 2 Examples are Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Australia, Canada, Japan and most Latin-American countries. For a state-of-the-art overview of copyright formalities in national copyright law in the 1850s, 1900s and 1950s, see A.W. Volkmann, Zusammenstellung der gesetzlichen Bestimmungen über das Urheber-und products and the cost of dissemination was high, the current digital networked environment allows for interactive, simultaneous and decentralized production and access. In addition, as digitization has considerably lowered the cost of production, storage and distribution, content goods have never before been made available to the public on such a large scale. 14 In view of that, there is an increased need for more legal certainty concerning the claim of copyright, for an improved rights clearance and for an enhanced free flow of information. It has been suggested that copyright formalities are able to meet these current needs. In the last decennium, this idea has encouraged several academics to call for a reintroduction of formalities in copyright law. 15 Unsurprisingly, the recent calls for a reintroduction of formalities are surrounded by quite some controversy. Although there are surely good reasons to reconsider imposing formalities, opponents of the idea claim that formalities have not been removed for nothing. 16 This raises the question which of these reasons in the present digital age should prevail. Put differently, the question is whether the historical issues with formalities are still relevant at present and, if so, how they weigh up against the opportunities that formalities can bring in the digital era.
To examine this question, this paper first considers the new challenges for copyright that have come to the fore in the digital environment (section 2) and scrutinizes whether formalities may help with facing these challenges (section 3). It reaches the conclusion that formalities can fulfil a useful role in this respect. Subsequently, the legal-historical concerns that in the previous centuries caused the abolition of formalities are introduced (section 4) and contextualized (section 5). It will be shown that, although some of the historical concerns may still apply at present, they do not completely militate against formalities. Moreover, digital networked technologies have made it entirely feasible to establish registration and deposit 14 James Gibson, 'Once and Future Copyright', Notre Dame Law Review, 81 (2005) , 167-243 (pp. 212 et seq.). 15 The reintroduction of formalities has been called for, inter alia, by Lawrence Lessig, schemes. Therefore, it appears that the legal-historical concerns do not impede the reintroduction of formalities altogether. Accordingly, this paper queries whether the absence of formalities in copyright law should perhaps be perceived as a temporary phenomenon only. It proposes that it might be time to set aside some of the legal-historical objections against copyright formalities and to look ahead at how formalities could be deployed to meet the challenges that copyright faces today.
THE CHALLENGES FOR COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT
The calls for a reintroduction of formalities in copyright law are obviously a response to the momentous change in the production and usage of copyright protected works caused by the advent of digital technologies. While creating and commercially exploiting creative content used to be the almost exclusive province of creative industries, it has now become something that nearly anyone can undertake. The widespread availability of computers, digital recording devices and online networks as media for dissemination has allowed and, in fact, encouraged people to create and distribute works to a potentially worldwide audience. This undeniably has presented new challenges for copyright. Above all, it has increased the need to establish legal certainty concerning the claim of copyright, to improve rights clearance and to enhance the free flow of information. These challenges are considered in more detail below.
ESTABLISHING LEGAL CERTAINTY CONCERNING THE CLAIM OF COPYRIGHT
Because of the fact that copyright arises automatically upon the creation of an original work of authorship, it is not always easy to establish ex ante whether a particular object is protected by This may cause legal uncertainty for authors, copyright owners and users alike. Unlike patents, designs and trademark rights, the property titles of which are defined by registration, the absence of copyright formalities together with the 'lack of legislative definitional closure' of copyright-protectable subject matter makes an ex ante definition of the claim of copyright very difficult. 22 For authors and copyright owners this may create legal uncertainty, as only ex post can it be established whether and to what extent they have acquired copyright over their creations. In addition, users face legal uncertainty when they use a particular object believing no copyright subsists in it, only to be informed ex post by the courts that it is copyright protected.
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With the recent expansion of the domain of copyright to industrial and technical creations (such as software), as well as 'creations' of a more obscure character (such as the scent of perfume and simple conversations), the need for a clear ex ante qualification of creations as protectable subject matter has become ever more pressing. The vaguer the limits of copyrightprotectable subject matter are, the more ambiguous the claim of copyright is. 24 This explains why in some countries voluntary registers have been created for the registration of e.g. television formats, websites and slogans. 25 Moreover, the recent calls for the establishment of registers for the registration of the source code of computer programmes can be better understood against this background.
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Additionally, even if it may reasonably be assumed that a creation falls within the subject matter of copyright and is sufficiently original, no property claim will exist if the term of protection has expired. The term of protection may be difficult to establish, however, if a work does not contain any information concerning the author or date of first publication.
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For several types of works (e.g. photos, film footage, etc.) it will not be uncommon that this information is not provided. Therefore, if it cannot be determined whether a work is still protected by copyright, this again could prove a source of legal uncertainty for prospective users. 
IMPROVING RIGHTS CLEARANCE
Another area where the current copyright system presents real challenges involves the clearance of rights. Whereas, in the digital environment, reutilizing creative content has become easy, inexpensive and commonplace, copyright protected works cannot be used legally without the consent of the copyright owner (unless the usage is covered by an exception or limitation). As a consequence, the copyright owner must first be identified and located. This may be difficult, as not all works carry a statement indicating the authorship or ownership of rights and, even if they do, this information may be outdated due to a change of ownership.
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Often, information on copyright ownership cannot be obtained from other sources either, because, in the absence of copyright formalities, adequate and up-to-date copyright registers are scarce.
Although these licensing difficulties are certainly not new, they clearly have exacerbated in recent times. While in the pre-digital era, the production and dissemination of creative content was restricted to the relatively few authors that could exploit their works through a publishing 26 34 Over the years, information on copyright ownership may become outdated or even lost, for instance, because the copyright has been assigned to an unknown third party or because a corporate body owning the copyright has gone out of business. A longer term of protection may also lead to an exponential growth of the number of right holders in the later years of the term of protection, thereby resulting in an increased fragmentation of rights. This is particularly true in case of hereditary succession of rights upon the death of the author. See Van Gompel (2007), supra, pp. 674-75.
ENHANCING THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION
A last important challenge for copyright law lies in preventing the automatic 'lock up' in the copyright system of all creative content. In the absence of copyright formalities, the threshold for obtaining copyright protection is rather low. In general, any literary or artistic work that is sufficiently original is automatically protected by copyright (some states impose an additional condition to the effect that the work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression). As a result, the vast majority of creative output that is created nowadays is propertized under copyright law.
35
Irrespective of whether or not authors want to avail themselves of protection, they enjoy exclusive copyrights in their works until at least 50 years -and in many countries 70 or more years -after their death. This allows them or their successors in title, at the exclusion of all others, to authorize or prohibit the reproduction, distribution, communication or making available to the public of their works.
In the pre-digital era, when distribution costs were high and the level of interactivity low, it may not have made such a great difference that copyright automatically attached to all (fixed) content that was sufficiently original. Due to the high costs involved in the dissemination of content goods, it could generally be assumed that anyone engaged in exploiting a creative work desired protection against free-riding by others. The fact that virtually all creative content was protected automatically, even if it did not necessarily merit protection (e.g. if it
was not meant for commercial exploitation), had few detrimental effects. Most creative works that were not commercially exploited were simply not directly available for use. As all content was locked up in physical information products, it was accessible only to those few people that could obtain a copy of the work. Also, 'analogue' works did not easily lend themselves to be used as building blocks for new creative efforts. As a result, little transformative use was made of pre-existing works. The public still consisted of passive consumers of media content.
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All this has changed dramatically in the digital era. Modern digital networked technologies offer the capacity to produce and distribute works on a large scale and at a modest expense.
Nowadays, anyone with a computer and internet access can upload content and distribute it on the world-wide-web. Therefore, creative content has never been more readily accessible to the public than it has now. This allows citizens, researchers and creative industries to take full advantage of digital content and make it usable for studies, work, leisure or as raw material for 35 See Laddie (1996) , supra, p. 9: 'Another of the problems with copyright law is that […] the requirements for qualification are so low to be virtually non-existent. In view of this, it is highly questionable whether, in the current digital era, all works should automatically warrant copyright protection. The old maxim that 'what is worth copying is prima facie worth protecting' 37 seems to become increasingly irrelevant in the online environment. While copyright undeniably aims at protecting creators and creative industries against free-riding by others, the costs of producing and disseminating content have fallen so significantly that it is doubtful whether all works automatically merit the strong and long-term copyright protection that is presently granted.
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In addition, the assumption that that 'most of the most useful and valuable creative content' should be automatically protected by copyright law seems odd, 39 in view of the fact that more and more works are created, not for commercial purposes, but for the benefit of social sharing and remixing.
Obviously, this by no means implies that copyright law has become totally redundant. On the contrary, lots of creative content still warrants protection. 'Without the law, the incentives to produce creative work would be vastly reduced. Large-budget films could not be produced; many books would not get written.' 40 However, the fact that certain creations do deserve the protection of copyright is not the issue here. The point is that copyright law lacks the flexibility to assure that those works that do not necessarily merit protection -or at least not for the full copyright term -are not unnecessarily locked up in the copyright regime, but remain free to be used by others. From the analysis below, it will be seen that formalities may contribute significantly to achieving this goal. 
FACING THE CHALLENGES: A NEW ROLE FOR COPYRIGHT FORMALITIES?
In addressing the above challenges, formalities may have a useful role to play. 41 However, the degree to which the problems may be overcome depends largely on the particularities of the formality employed. Before exploring the role of copyright formalities in the light of today's challenges, therefore, the various kinds and categories of formalities will be introduced and defined.
THE DIFFERENT KINDS AND CATEGORIES OF FORMALITIES
Copyright formalities exist in different kinds. The most prominent examples are copyright registration, recordation of assignments of copyright, renewal registration, legal deposit and copyright notices (the familiar 'c-in-a-circle' and the various notices of reservation of rights).
Moreover, depending on their role in the copyright system, formalities vary greatly in nature and legal effects. In this regard, four categories of formalities can be distinguished:
(1) constitutive formalities: formalities on which the coming into existence of copyright depends;
(2) renewal formalities: formalities that after a certain period must be completed to renew (and extend) copyright protection;
(3) specifying formalities: formalities that affect the enjoyment of a particular type of right, usually of a specific class of works (e.g. notices of reservation to retain a public performance right in musical compositions); 42 and (4) declarative formalities: formalities on which the ability to legally enforce copyright, to recover statutory damages or to claim other -e.g. procedural -benefits depends.
43 41 See also Samuelson (2007), supra, p. 563 arguing that 'copyright formalities may have a useful role in reshaping copyright norms and practices in the more complex world that has evolved in recent years', thereby referring in particular to 'the problems of too many copyrights and not enough notice of copyright claims and ownership interests', which basically are the problems that we have identified in para. 1 above. 42 The term 'registration as specification ' 43 Examples of declarative formalities can still be found in US federal copyright law, which still relies heavily on copyright formalities. For works of US origin, registration is a prerequisite for initiating an infringement action. Moreover, for works of both US and foreign origin, the recovery of statutory damages and attorney's fees is limited to instances of infringement occurring after registration. See 17 U.S.C. § § 411 and 412.
THE FUNCTIONS OF COPYRIGHT FORMALITIES
Formalities may perform various significant functions depending on their kind and role in the copyright system. First, constitutive and renewal formalities play an important role as filtering instruments between works for which authors desire copyright protection and those for which they do not.
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If authors must fulfil a formality before their works are eligible for protection, they are obliged to make an initial assessment of whether or not their works are sufficiently commercially valuable to warrant protection, i.e. whether the expected revenue of royalties would exceed the costs of completing the formality.
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The same assessment must be made if copyright is subject to a renewal formality. If this assessment appears favourable, authors are likely to fulfil the formality so as to secure protection for their works. If not, they most likely will refrain from doing so and the work will enter the public domain. 46 Thus, in their capacity as filtering instruments, formalities may greatly enhance the free flow of information.
Second, formalities may fulfil important signalling functions for the public. If, in a system where copyright protection relies on formalities, works for which no protection is desired are easily identifiable as being unprotected (e.g. if no notice is attached to the work or if the work has not been registered or deposited in a public registry), it is instantly recognizable when a work resides in the public domain and thus can be used without prior authorization. This will significantly increase legal certainty for prospective users.
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More legal certainty will also be established if formalities provide indicators that facilitate the calculation of the duration of protection (e.g. if they would require authors and/or right owners to make relevant information concerning the author or date of first publication publicly available).
In the same vein, formalities may help to define and identify copyright-protectable subject matter. Constitutive formalities could provide the public with a clear indication of works for which authors claim protection. Obviously, this would not imply that these works automatically satisfy the substantive requirement(s) for protection. That will always be a Moreover, if copyright depended on registration, it is likely that registering bodies are given the discretionary power to refuse registering creations that obviously do not qualify as 'literary or artistic works' or lack sufficient originality (which should of course be subject to appeal by the applicant). This would help preventing all kinds of trivial works from entering the copyright arena. Likewise, it is possible that in cases of highly complex and technical works, applicants would be required to clearly indicate the elements of information for which they seek protection. Requirements of this kind are not uncommon in other fields of intellectual property law. In a patent specification, for example, the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention must be particularly pointed out and distinctly claimed and, if necessary, be accompanied by a drawing. Finally, formalities may constitute an indispensable source of information relevant to the clearance of rights. If authors and copyright owners were obliged to register their copyrights in 48 In other fields of intellectual property law, it is completely normal that, despite the grant of protection upon completing the prescribed formalities, the substantive requirements for protection can be tested by the court. A patent application, for example, can typically be invalidated by the court on the ground that the subject matter of the patent is not patentable within the terms of the law. Hence, formalities may perform a key role in facilitating the licensing of copyright, thereby stimulating the legitimate use of copyright protected content.
CONCLUSION
The above overview demonstrates that formalities may function to the benefit of the public at large. By enlarging the public domain, enabling the public to differentiate between protected subject matter and unprotected content, facilitating licensing and enhancing legal certainty for users and copyright owners alike, they may contribute significantly to facilitating the regular exercise of rights. In view of this fact, it seems safe to conclude that formalities may well be fit to address the challenges that copyright is facing in the current digital environment.
But this is just one side of the coin. Although reintroducing formalities may have become something worthy of consideration, one cannot ignore the fact that, despite the fact that formalities fulfilled similar functions in the history of copyright, they were nevertheless abolished. The next sections therefore introduce and contextualize the legal-historical concerns with formalities. 53 
THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN: THE LEGAL-HISTORICAL CONCERNS WITH COPYRIGHT FORMALITIES
As observed in the introduction, from the late-nineteenth or early-twentieth centuries onward, copyright formalities began to lose their significance at both the national and the international levels. The reasons for this are manifold. In general, they can be grouped into four categories, which concern the ideological foundation of copyright, the 'natural justice' legitimation of copyright, the concept of abstract-authored works and the practical implications for securing international copyright protection. These four concerns are examined in more detail here.
THE IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF COPYRIGHT
One of the primary arguments against formalities is that they are believed to be inconsistent with the idea that copyright is not granted by the legislature, but arises 'naturally' and ex lege upon the creation of an original work of authorship. Under this conception, copyright is not created by law, but the law merely recognizes its existence and demarcates its legal boundaries.
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It is generally considered that to subject the enjoyment or the exercise of copyright to formalities would be to undercut the notion that the right originates directly from the act of creation.
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This idea can be traced back to the continental-European property and personality rights theories of copyright (droit d'auteur), which developed in France and Germany during the course of the nineteenth century. In France, justification for the protection of authors' rights was increasingly found to exist in their identification as property rights. natural right to property which exists in his own person and which he originally acquires by appropriating the commons through his labour, 58 the proponents of the theory of literary and artistic property stressed the inextricable bond between the work and its author. 59 By regarding the person of the creator as 'the natural law basis of literary and artistic property', 60 they believed authors' rights to emanate directly from the quality of the authors' own intellectual creations. 61 The rights were considered to have always existed in the legal conscience of men. 62 The law was seen as merely recognizing the existence and regulating the exercise of authors' rights. 63 This idea also became widespread among nineteenth-century German intellectuals. As in France, authors' rights were progressively regarded as rights of intellectual property ('geistigen Eigentum').
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In parallel, another theory evolved in Germany that gave even more prominence to the person of the author as the creator of his work. This was the personality theory, which was based largely on the philosophies of Kant, who recognized that authors have an innate right vested in their own person ('ius personalissimum'), 65 and Fichte, who introduced the differentiation between freely usable 'content' and the protectable 'form' of the author's thoughts and ideas (comparable to the idea/expression dichotomy). 66 This last differentiation especially provided a strong justification for copyright to be vested in the author. By assuring protection against any taking of the personal and unique form in which the author had expressed his thoughts or ideas, this new abstract concept linked everything done to the work back to the personality of the author. 67 This laid the groundwork for a number of German scholars to develop the theory of a largely personal author's right. 68 By accentuating the personal element in the author's creation, they claimed that authors' rights arise directly from the authorship of a work. 69 Hence, they considered these rights to come into being through the very act of creation ('die geistige Schöpfungsthat') and through the act of creation alone. 70 This had some important consequences for the way in which formalities were perceived. In general, the idea that copyright was born with the creation of a work did not correspond with the notion of formalities being constitutive of the right. Thus, there was a growing consensus that the existence of copyright should not be subject to formalities and that failure to comply with formalities should never be the occasion of a defeat of copyright protection. 
THE 'NATURAL JUSTICE' LEGITIMATION OF COPYRIGHT
Another argument still put forth today by many legal scholars is that formalities would conflict with the 'natural justice' or fairness legitimation of copyright.
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This argument is closely connected with the assumed incompatibility between formalities and the ideological 'natural rights' underpinnings of copyright law. Because the legitimation of copyright is seen in the very nature of the author's personal creation, the supporters of this theory believe that the author should not only be properly rewarded for the creative efforts he has put in his work (economic rights), but should also be protected against acts that could damage or alter his work or that could prejudice his name or reputation (moral rights). 73 In view of that, these scholars are very sceptical about formalities. They regard it as unreasonable if authors should inadvertently and unjustly lose protection due to a failure to complete a formality, as this may unnecessarily harm their economic and personal interests. 74 The notion of 'natural justice' again originates in the nineteenth century. In view of the personal and 'sacred' bond between the author and his work, 75 it was increasingly held to be unfair if authors could lose protection over a failure (e.g. an inconsistency or neglect) in the process of completing a formality. This was especially the case if the failure was ascribable to another person than the author (e.g. if the formality could also be legally complied with by the publisher), 76 to complicated procedure and costs involved (e.g. if the facilities where a formality should be accomplished were centralized and located too far away) or to mere technicalities, such as innocent mistakes or late submissions of applications. 77 In the nineteenth century, it was not uncommon for authors to lose protection as a result of any of these practicalities.
THE CONCEPT OF ABSTRACT-AUTHORED WORKS
Another, more general problem is that formalities do not combine well with the abstraction implicit in works of authorship. Since formalities typically are connected with the outside appearance of a work, the distinctive features that make the work eligible for protection, i.e.
the level of originality and subjectivity in the author's creation, are not easily captured by formalities.
This concern came to the fore when, in the nineteenth century, copyright law 'moved from the concrete to the abstract'. 78 Instead of merely granting protection against a straightforward reproduction of printed matter (books, maps, charts, journals and sheet music) or pre-fixed works of art (sculptures, engravings, drawings and paintings), protection was increasingly conferred on works qua abstractum. Accordingly, severed from the physical object in which literary and artistic works were embodied or manifested, copyright protection was accorded to the personal and unique form of expression of the author's thoughts or ideas. 79 Formalities, however, are not easily applicable to abstract work identities. In particular in the pre-digital era, it was considered difficult (if not impossible) 'to reduce the subject matter of copyright law beyond the material form in which it existed'. 80 Because a representative description or sample of the intangible property was hard to give, literary and artistic works needed to be reproduced in their full physical manifestation to be able to identify the subject matter of protection. 81 Not all works lend themselves easily to reproduction however. Artistic works and special or limited editions of literary works were particularly difficult to duplicate and, even if technically reproducible, it would be inapt to demand a deposit of replicas or copies of these works, as the cost of reproduction were often prohibitively high. 82 Moreover, formalities could not be completed unless a work was fixed in a tangible medium.
seemed less indispensable for an efficient protection of copyright.
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This was even more so after the law had introduced legal presumption of authorship, stipulating that, without proof to the contrary, the person who was named as author on the work was deemed to be the actual author.
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This weakened the importance of registration or deposit for establishing priority.
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In addition, in copyright law, there was less need of avoiding difficulties of proof regarding independent creation (Doppelschöpfung). If compared with designs and patents law, the chances that this occurred were limited, due to the very personal nature of literary and artistic property. 
THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF FORMALITIES
There are significant concerns with formalities at the international level as well. In contrast to the above-mentioned ideological and legal-theoretical concerns, however, these international concerns are mostly pragmatic. In the mid-nineteenth century, when international copyright protection was first explored, the patchwork of bilateral agreements by which protection was secured laid down numerous formalities.
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Hence, if authors sought protection in a foreign territory, they usually were required to fulfil the formalities prescribed by the relevant bilateral 85 The possibility to prove the author's identity by means other than formalities was stressed by John Leighton, a British artist, at the 1878 International Conference on Artistic Property in Paris. He maintained that registration was redundant because the author of a work could always be recognized by experts, either by his writing, his drawing, his brushstroke, or the manner of painting. See Congrès International de la Propriété Artistique (1879), supra, p. 57. 86 In Germany, for example, art. 28 of the Federal the Copyright Act of 1870 laid down a general presumption of authorship, stipulating that without proof to the contrary, the person who was named as author on the work was deemed to be the actual author. The Berne Convention also contained legal presumptions of authorship from its early inception. See art. 11 BC (1886). Nowadays, similar presumptions are contained in art. 15 BC (1971). 87 Legal presumption of authorship were considered to give authors greater latitude for the assertion of their rights. While less onerous for authors, they were believed to generally achieve the same outcome as formalities. Since most formalities provided prima facie proof only, legal certainty could equally be established by a set of legal presumptions. Because the facts recorded by formalities usually were not verified ex ante, their correctness could always be contested. In principle, therefore, formalities only proved that a fact was recorded at a certain time. treaty. This made it very difficult to secure international protection, especially at a multinational level.
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When the issue of formalities was considered in the framework of the Berne Convention, therefore, the drafters were led by a strong desire to liberate authors from the multitude of formalities which they needed to complete to secure protection in different countries.
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This resulted in the adoption of the rule, in 1886, that Union authors received protection under the Berne Convention once they completed the formalities in the country of origin of the work.
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In practice, however, this rule caused problems, as it required national courts in international disputes to interpret the laws of foreign countries.
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Moreover, some countries still continued to require that foreign authors claiming protection under the Berne Convention comply with domestic formalities.
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Therefore, a further simplification was needed to enable authors to optimally secure international copyright protection. This was found in the independence of protection and the corresponding prohibition on formalities, which still apply at present.
CONTEXTUALIZING THE LEGAL-HISTORICAL CONCERNS WITH COPYRIGHT FORMALITIES
In view of the ideological and practical concerns with copyright formalities considered above, it is not difficult to understand why copyright gradually lost its attachment to formalities in the course of the twentieth century. This is not to say, however, that the historical reasons for abolishing formalities are absolute impediments for their possible reintroduction. First, copyright formalities do not seem to be entirely at odds with the labour theory and natural rights approach underlying the property and personality rights theories of copyright (droit d'auteur). These theories concentrate on the acquisition of rights and therefore on their enjoyment (i.e. the existence of rights), rather than their exercise.
95 Accordingly, they merely oppose reliance on formalities as prerequisites for the coming into being of copyright, but they do not seem to preclude formalities that affect the exercise of copyright as such.
In fact, the exercise of copyright has never been absolute and unconditional. Just as the law contains exceptions to and limitations of copyright, there appears to be no reason why, from a principled standpoint, the exercise of copyright could not be subjected to formalities of some kind.
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At the most, it could be argued that such formalities should always be accompanied by adequate legal safeguards to accommodate the legitimate interests of authors and copyright owners.
97
Likewise, because the duration of copyright is limited but unspecified by nature, it could be asserted that, from a principled point of view, there appears to be little objection to subjecting copyright to more differentiated terms, e.g. renewable terms that are conditional on compliance with formalities, instead of to a fixed term after the author's death, as is currently the case. However, since the duration of copyright is directly linked to its legitimation, this should be preceded by a careful, balanced and comprehensive discussion on the optimal term of protection.
98
Such an exercise is necessary to determine to what extent differentiated terms can be introduced, given the 'natural justice' and other rationales of copyright. to legally enforce it, assign it, license it, etc.). 96 In nineteenth-century France, all limitations to copyright were considered permissible by the proponents of literary and artistic property, as long as they did not affect the author's title of ownership and thus the property rights in his work, during the statutorily prescribed terms of protection. See Pfister (2005) , supra, pp. 166-67. 97 It could perhaps be asserted that similar safeguards should apply as the three-step test lays down in relation to exceptions and limitations. However, it is debatable whether this would be desirable. Formalities are not one-toone comparable to exceptions and limitations. On the one hand, formalities are less far-reaching in the sense that authors and copyright owners control themselves whether or not they comply with them. Unlike exceptions and limitations, which in specific cases must simply be tolerated, they remain in command of their own rights as long as they observe the prescribed formalities. On the other hand, the legal consequences of non-compliance with formalities may be far more rigid. Where exceptions and limitations apply in specific cases only, authors and copyright owners may lose control over the exercise of their rights in case they have failed to complete formalities. This calls for additional legal safeguards, which may perhaps be found in the possibility to cure any inadvertent omission of formalities within a reasonable timeframe (see e.g. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2) (1976)). 98 The optimal duration of copyright protection is directly linked to its legitimation: finding the optimal term of protection is to identify the point at which the objectives for which copyright was granted in the first place are best realized. Until today, however, the literature on law and economics has failed to identify an optimal term of In summary, provided that copyright formalities leave the genesis of copyright unaffected and cause no unnecessary prejudice to the legitimate interests of copyright owners, they seem to be consistent with its ideological underpinnings and 'natural justice' legitimation.
This can also be perceived in the history of copyright. Despite the rise of 'natural' property and personality rights theories in nineteenth-century continental Europe, there was common understanding that the exercise of copyright could always be restricted if that were to be in the public interest. 100 This was equally the case for other property rights. 101 Because of its cultural importance and social utility, it was deemed completely normal that copyright at a certain moment would enter the public domain (and thus had a limited duration) and that its exercise could be subject to particular formalities. 102 This clarifies to a great extent why, despite the growing belief that copyright is born with the creation of a work, copyright formalities were nevertheless continued. In France, for example, the legal deposit was thought to fulfil a few key functions for facilitating the regular exercise of copyright. 103 Therefore, in the nineteenth century, copyright formalities were considered to have a central role in upholding the balance between safeguarding the rights of authors and the public interest. 104 This may explain why several countries continued imposing formalities until (far into) the twentieth century.
Equally, the pragmatic reasons that added to the growing irrelevance of formalities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries do not fundamentally oppose formalities either, but must rather be understood in their historical context. While the practical difficulties surely weighted heavy in the previous centuries, in the present digital age, many of the old pragmatic concerns over formalities appear to no longer exist or at least may be easier to overcome. In the online environment, registration and deposit systems can be organized quite efficiently. 105 Moreover, regardless of the abstraction implicit in works of authorship, these formalities can be made applicable to virtually any type of work (except for works that are unfixed). While in the predigital era, a good description of the essence of a work (e.g. an artistic work) may have been hard to provide, modern technologies for digital recording and reproduction, such as digital photo and video cameras, have enabled almost any type of work to easily and cost-effectively be reproduced verbatim, so as to capture its distinctive -subjective and original -features.
Lastly, the practical implications of formalities for securing international copyright seem to be fairly easy to overcome, at least from a theoretical standpoint. The success and ubiquity of the world-wide-web has enabled the creation of online registers, which would allow anyone with a computer and internet access to register and upload works.
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At the international level, these registers could be amalgamated in a central register. Alternatively, an international (e.g.
WIPO-administered) online register could be established. This would have great advantages, because, as we have seen, the copyright market has become increasingly international.
To avoid the historical difficulties of securing copyright in multiple countries, however, international registration schemes of this kind should be accompanied by international rules.
In this respect, recourse could be made e.g. to the rule under the Berne Convention of 1886 stipulating that to acquire international protection, it would suffice to fulfil the formalities in the country of origin of the work. Yet, this would have the downside in that, if formalities would not be imposed in all countries worldwide, authors may circumvent the formalities of their home country by publishing their works in a country that does not prescribe formalities.
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It seems that the 1886 rule cannot be successfully reinstated, therefore, without international consensus on the necessity of reintroducing formalities. On the other hand, if an 105 See e.g. Lessig (2008) , supra, p. 265: 'Technology offers an extraordinary opportunity for making registration work efficiently.' 106 Admittedly, not all people around the world have easy access to computers and the internet. There still are major divides between the industrialized and developing world. In view of that, reintroducing copyright formalities on a worldwide scale may not yet be a realistic option. On the other hand, things should not be exaggerated. The level of computer and internet access in developing countries is growing steadily and even in the least developed countries, people are increasingly provided internet access on local public terminals. 107 See note 6 above.
international register were established, it would also be possible to provide that international protection is secured upon registering a work in this register. This may be difficult to realize,
given the large number of contracting states to the Berne Convention.
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Hence, even if, at the international level, the pragmatic objections against formalities have largely disappeared, in practice solutions may be difficult to achieve, given the requirement of international consensus on this -at least for some countries -rather delicate topic. Still, this does not mean that the idea of reintroducing formalities should be entirely abandoned. If there are legitimate reasons for doing so -and this paper has identified at least a few of these reasons -attempts at international consensus-building could certainly be further pursued.
CONCLUSION
By contrasting the current calls for reintroducing formalities with the legal-historical reasons for their abolishment, this paper has identified and examined some of the main arguments in favour of and against a reintroduction of copyright formalities. Evaluating these arguments in the light of today's digital realities, it can safely be concluded that there is now sufficient reason to look upon the issue of copyright formalities with new eyes.
The challenges for copyright that have emerged as a result of the increased production of digital content and its direct and ubiquitous accessibility in the online environment undeniably warrant legislative reform. The growing needs for creating more legal certainty concerning the claim of copyright, for improving copyright clearance and for enhancing the free flow of information are so pressing that it seems untenable to leave these challenges unaddressed.
Resurrecting copyright formalities may be one of the most salient ways of dealing with the current needs. Because of their inherent capacities to enlarge the public domain, to define and facilitate the recognition of copyright-protectable subject matter, to improve the licensing of copyright protected works and to enhance legal certainty for users and copyright owners alike, formalities seem fit to address the challenges that copyright is presently facing.
Moreover, from a contemporary viewpoint, the legal-historical reasons that contributed to the abolishment of formalities are no absolute impediment for their reintroduction. Although some ideological concerns with formalities, particularly the claims of the ex lege 'natural law' existence of and 'natural justice' legitimation of copyright, still appear relevant today, they do not seem to form an impregnable barrier to the reinstitution of formalities. In addition, the practical objections to copyright formalities, which relate to their awkwardness in the context of abstract-authored works and in securing international protection, have largely disappeared or at least may be easier to overcome. From a legal-theoretical point of view, therefore, there is sufficient ground to further explore and study the possible reintroduction of formalities.
In conclusion, in questioning whether formalities in the digital era provide an obstacle or an opportunity, this paper argues in favour of the latter. Copyright has never been an absolute and unconditional right, but has always reflected a balancing of interests between authors and the public. In the history of copyright law, formalities clearly played a key role in maintaining this balance. Although, in the twentieth century, they were abolished for obvious reasons, it is reasonable to ask whether they should now be reintroduced in the light of the changes caused by the advent of digital technologies. As this paper demonstrates, there indeed is sufficient reason to believe that reviving the copyright formalities of yesterday may help to address the challenges of today, with the object of preserving copyright for tomorrow.
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